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Four ship classes were analyzed as candidates for Naval
Reserve training assignments. They are FF-10^0 and FF-1052
Class frigates, DD-931 Class destroyers, and LST-1179 Class
tank landing ships. Reserve crew billets proposed for each
alternative were compared to FY 1980 Naval Reserve manpower
availability in seventeen seaport localities to identify
training ship assignment options. For each option, the
possibility of a second reserve training crew was
investigated.
Operating and upkeep costs for each alternative were
analyzed to provide other information relevant to training
ship assignments. Costs included were direct costs regularly
incurred, exclusive of extraordinary items.
Two conclusions were drawn from the findings. First, the
mission of the training ship program could be accomplished
with fewer ships than now assigned. Second, the cost
advantage of LST-1179 Class tank landing ships is offset by
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Since 1973 the U.S. Armed Forces have been manned
according to the total force concept [Binkin, 197^]. The
total force has been described by the President's Defense
Manpower Commission as the combination of active duty and
reserve military personnel, government employees, and
industrial contractors ^Defense Manpower Commission, 19763 •
There are two reasons why this defense design was adopted.
The first reason is that the total force concept defines
the manpower resource base such that the U.S. can maintain
a peacetime military force capable of a rapid increase in
size. The second reason is that the use of a total force
concept reduces the monetary and social costs to the
citizens which would be necessary if the U.S. were to main-
tain an armed force sufficient to simultaneously meet all
of its military commitments around the world [Binkin, 197^3*
The reserves comprise about one-third of the three
million men and women serving in the military portion of the
total force [^Hessman, 19783* The mission and purpose of the
nation's military reserve is defined under Title 10, Section
262 of the U.S. Code as follows:
The purpose of each reserve component is to provide
trained units and qualified persons available for active
duty in the armed forces, in time of war or National
emergency and at such other times as the National security
requires. To fill the needs of the armed forces whenever,
during and after the period needed to procure and train
additional units and qualified persons to achieve the
planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed
than are in the regular components.

There are seven reserve military components [Binkin 197^1
•
These are the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Re-
serve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Air National
Guard, and Coast Guard Reserve. These seven reserve com-
ponents serve as a standby adjunct to one of the five
military services. The Navy's standby reserve component is
the Naval Reserve. The focus of this paper is on the
quality and quantity of training equipment available to the
Naval Reserve and specifically the surface ship portion of
the Naval Reserve.
The surface Naval Reserve has been provided with training
ships on a regular basis since the end of the Second World
War. These training ships initially came from the large
inventory of surplus vessels held by the Navy after demobil-
ization in 19^6 [Evans, 1979J • Since that time, training
ships transferred to the Naval Reserve have been those with
outmoded technology being phased out of the fleet as a result
of ship construction or modernization programs [Evans, 19791-
Current Navy policy is that less capable ships will continue
to be transferred into the Naval Reserve provided they have
reasonable remaining service life [_Chief of Naval Operations
(a), 1978].
Of the fifty ships operating as Naval Reserve trainers
in 1979 t nearly one-half were World War II vintage destroyers
[Dept. of Defense FY80 Appropriations, House Hearings). Due
to their operational unreliability and obsolescent design,
the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) for the 1980
10

Department of Defense budget included retirement without
replacement of nearly all of these old destroyers £u.S. Dept
of Defense (b) , 1979 ] • However, unfavorable response from
Congress to the proposed reduction in the surface ship
portion of the Naval Reserve caused the Navy to reprogram
the 1980 budget and keep most of the old training ships in
service [Tuck, 1979J • Although the reprogramming action pre-
vented their retirement in 1980, the old Naval Reserve
training destroyers are five years past their useful life
expectancy and must eventually be placed out of service
[Dept. of Defense FY80 Appropriations, House Hearings].
When these ships are finally retired it will be necessary
to decide what replacement ships, if any, will serve as
Naval Reserve training platforms.
If it is decided that replacement ships can be made
available for Naval Reserve training assignments, the ships
involved and their homeport locations will have to be
determined. These last two decisions are the basis for the
analysis presented in this paper.
In addition to strong Congressional support for the
Naval Reserve, at least three other conditions should be
considered prior to analyzing the use of surface ships as
Naval Reserve training vessels. These are the candidate
ships available, the availability of manpower, and the cost
of operating ships.
The first factor, the availability of training hardware,
considers the Navy's surface force which includes all ships
11

except for aircraft carriers and submarines. The surface
force is expected to increase in numbers of ships through
1985 » as shown in Table 1. The projected figures shown
in Table 1 primarily result from expected construction and
delivery schedules for the FFG-7 Perry Class guided missle
fast frigates. Should overseas deployment, regular overhaul
cycles and ship retirement schedules remain unchanged, the
fleet will have a greater number of surface ships by the
mid-1980' s ^Redfern, 1979].
The second factor is the availability of active duty
and reserve manpower. Active duty personnel shortages are
expected in twenty-four enlisted ratings for at least the
next five years QKoehler (b) , 1979 ]• Each enlisted rating
is analogous to a civilian trade in that a set of technical
skills relating to specific equipment is required for initial
entry into the specialty area and the level of required
technical knowledge increases as individuals advance in pay
status. Of the twenty-four ratings expected to remain under-
manned, as many as thirteen are applicable to surface ships
whose older technology could make them candidates for duty
as training ships [Chief of Naval Operations (e), 1979]'
Table 2 is provided to compare projected 1980 active duty
manpower shortages in these thirteen rating areas with the
availability of Naval Reservists near major seaports. This
particular portion of the total Naval Reserve population is
significant because the 100 mile travel authorization limit
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use of a training ship to this group ^Bureau of Naval
Personnel, 1979]. The figures in Table 2 show that for
some ratings and paygrades , the coastal seaport portion of
the Naval Reserve population could supply manpower to fill
many or all of the projected active duty "billet vacancies,
However, although these individuals are available, their
geographic dispersion may affect decisions regarding the
types of training ships to choose and their homeport locations
The third factor is the cost of owning and operating
ships whose primary mission is to train Naval Reserve per-
sonnel for wartime contingencies. Because of the high cost
of transporting Naval Reservists overseas to meet their
ships for two week annual training periods, Naval Reserve
training ships have not deployed on a regular basis since
197^ ^Evans, 1979 J- However, since nearly all other ships
in the fleet routinely deploy to project a U.S. presence
overseas, the operation of local Naval Reserve training ships
could be regarded as a drain on the budget resources other-
wise available to the peacetime deploying force. Therefore,
with this in mind, the analysis will investigate the feasi-
bility of operating a smaller less-costly number of Naval
Reserve training ships, each training a greater number of
reserve personnel.
In choosing the ship classes analyzed in this study, three
criteria were used. The first two are part of the Navy's
policy for transfers to the Naval Reserve. These are rea-
sonable remaining service life and less operational
15

capability compared to more recent designs [Chief of Naval
Operations (a), 1978] • The third criterion is that each
class chosen contain a sufficient number of ships to allow
its consideration as a major source of Naval Reserve training
hardware. Four classes of ships met these criteria and were
analyzed as potential Naval Reserve training platforms.
These four are DD-931 Forest Sherman Class Destroyers,
FF-10^0 Garcia Class Fast Frigates, FF-1052 Knox Class Fast
Frigates, and LST-1179 Newport Class Tank Landing Ships.
16

II. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
A. DISCUSSION
The analysis is divided into two sections: reserve
manpower availability and training ship annual cost. The
analysis is divided "because of the possibility that more
than one training ship's reserve mobilization crew manpower
requirements could be filled with the personnel available
in a specific locality. In case this should occur, the
cost of ship ownership could be used to choose between
alternatives.
In order to more fully understand the method of analysis,
current Naval Reserve training ship background information is
included. The background information aids understanding
because the information provides a basis for the shipboard
manning design proposed for each of the four training ship
alternatives. The shipboard manning design in turn defines
the cost of manpower which is a factor in the analysis of
the cost of operating and maintaining a training ship.
B. MANPOWER ANALYSIS
The Navy's reserve training destroyers are currently
manned with a composite crew consisting of about two-thirds
active duty (nucleus crew) personnel and one-third Naval
Reservists (reserve mobilization crew) T Evans , 1979~V The
17

nucleus crew is deliverately undermanned in order to
accommodate the reserve mobilization crew for one training
weekend at sea each month and for a two week underway period
each year. Although undermanned, the nucleus crew is capable
of operating the ship at sea in a limited combat capacity
without support from the reserve mobilization crew [_U.S.
Dept of Defense (a) , 1979J. In the event of a reserve
mobilization, both crews serve together on a full-time basis
enabling the training ship to assume a regular combat role
in the fleet.
The method for determining the nucleus/reserve
mobilization crew manning structure for each class of
training ship included in the analysis is based on the
requirements specified for standard conditions of manning
readiness in the OPNAV Instruction 5320 series as follows:
A condition of manning readiness is a description of a
unit preparedness relative to the general degree of
readiness in effect. As applied to manning, each con-
dition of readiness prescribes a combination of
operational, maintenance, administrative, and support
capabilities which require simultaneous or zero delay
response requiring a designated portion of unit per-
sonnel to be alert and actively performing assigned
duties.
There are five conditions of manning readiness J^Chief of
Naval Operations (b) through (e)]. The requirements of each
one are listed in Table 3« Beginning with a full shipboard
manning allowance at condition I, the manning conditions of
readiness shown in Table 3 identify the relationship between





MANNING CONDITIONS OF READINESS
Condition Requirements
I All personnel are alert and all ship systems
are manned and operating. No maintenance other
than urgent repairs or that normally performed
on watch is expected. Crew endurance at con-
dition I is expected to be 2h hours.
II Required ship systems are continuously manned
and operating. At least 4 to 6 hours rest
will be provided each man per day. Performance
of crew support functions and urgent preventive
maintenance is expected. Crew endurance at
condition II is expected to be 10 days.
III Ship systems are manned and operating as
necessary. Accomplishment of normal underway
maintenance, support, and administrative
functions is expected. Each man is to receive
the opportunity for 8 hours rest per day.
Crew endurance at condition III is expected to
be 60 days.
IV Ship systems are manned only to the extent
necessary for a safe and effective ship control,
propulsion, and security watch. Accomplishment
of underway maintenance, administrative, and
support functions is expected. Maximum advantage
is to be taken of training opportunities. Crew
endurance at condition IV is not manpower
constrained.
V Watchstations are assigned as required to
provide adequate security. An adequate number
of personnel are on board to meet potential
import emergencies. Accomplishment of maint-
enance, support, and administrative functions
is expected. Maximum advantage is to be taken
of training opportunities. Providing these
requirements are met, the crew is to be pro-
vided maximum opportunity for rest, leave, and
liberty.
Source: (Chief of Naval Operations (b) through (e))
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In order to provide a basis for comparison between the
proposed training ship alternatives, nucleus crew manning
assignments were primarily based on condition III watch-
station requirements. The reserve mobilization crew was
designed to have sufficient personnel depth and range such
that the nucleus/reserve mobilization crew combination will
permit the training ship to meet all of the requirements of
manning condition I.
Once the nucleus and reserve mobilization crew manpower
assignments for each training ship alternative were made,
each training ship alternative was then compared with the
surface Naval Reserve population in the vicinity of the major
seaports to determine which ships, if any, were compatible
with the reserve manpower available in each locality. The
geographic area included in each seaport locality analyzed
is bounded by the 100 mile travel limit authorized for a
Naval Reservists to and from the reservist's training site
^Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1978].
If the mobilization crew billets in any proposed training
ship could be filled using the local Naval Reserve population,
the remainder of that locality's population would then be
reviewed to determine the availability of additional per-
sonnel in the critical ratings listed in Table 2. There are
two reasons for doing this. The first is to explore the
possibility of utilizing the ships to provide training
for additional reservists having technical skills needed in
the fleet. The second reason is to provide the decision-
maker with additional information for the determination of
20

homeport locations in the event not enough ships are
available for transfer to the Naval Reserve.
C. COST ANALYSIS
Upon completion of the manpower portion of the analysis,
the annual cost to the Navy of operating each training ship
alternative was compared. There are two. reasons for doing
a training ship cost analysis. The first is to provide
additional information to aid in deciding which ships should
be assigned to the Naval Reserve. The second is to provide
another means to evaluate each alternative when a more than
one class of ship could be assigned to any of the seaport
locations being considered. The training ship cost analysis
includes the following items of ordinary operating cost:
a. Nucleus Crew Personnel Costs
b. Shipboard Upkeep and Maintenance Costs
c. Intermediate Maintenance Availability (IMA) Costs
d. Propulsion Fuel Costs
e. Regular Overhaul Costs
f. Base Utility Service Costs
The six cost items were included in the analysis because
they are costs regularly incurred throughout each training




This chapter describes a method of analysis which was
used to compare four alternative classes of ships to
determine their application as Naval Reserve training ships.
21

The analysis described v\as used to compare each training
ship alternative based on Naval Reserve manpower availability
in selected seaport localities and annual operating costs.
The purpose of the manpower analysis was to determine which
ships among the four alternatives are feasible training
ship assignment options. The purpose of cost analysis is
to provide additional information which could affect a
training ship assignment decision. In the next chapter,
the availability of Naval Reserve manpower is compared with
the reserve mobilization crew manning requirements of each
training ship alternative. In localities where training
ship assignments are feasible, the extent to which a second
reserve crew is available is also determined.
22

III. RESERVE TRAINING SHIP MANPOWER ANALYSIS
The reserve training ship manpower analysis is divided
into four sections. The first section includes nucleus and
reserve crew manning proposals for each training ship altern-
ative on the basis of the conditional manpower requirements
specified in the Ship's Manpower Document (SMD) . Reasons
for any exceptions to SMD manning requirements are included
for each crew proposal. The second section presents the
ship class and homeport assignment combinations found feasible
when reserve crew requirements were compared to the seaport
Naval Reserve population. Included in the section are
additional ship class and homeport assignment combinations
that were feasible when reserve crew manning requirements were
lowered. The third section contains a manning proposal for
an additional reserve training crew and the results obtained
when these manning proposals were compared to the remaining
Naval Reserve population in localities where ship assignments
were found feasible. The fourth section discusses the
potential degradation in training ship maintenance and
underway endurance due to reduced active duty manning.
A. TRAINING SHIP MANNING PROPOSALS
The nucleus and reserve mobilization crew manpower
proposals made for each training ship alternative are
shown in Tables k through 7- For each training ship altern-





THE DD-931 FOREST SHERMAN CLASS DESTROYER
PROPOSED ACTIYE/RESERVE MANNING STRUCTURE
Nucleus Crew Reserve Crew
QM 1 E-5, 1 B-4, 1 E-3 1 E-5. 1 E-4
BM 1 E-7. 3 E-4, 3 E-3 2 E-5. 1 E-6, 3 8-3
SM 1 E-6, 1 E-4, 2 E-3 1 E-5. 1 E-4
STO 1 E-6, 2 E-5. 3 E-3 1 E-7. 3 E-4, 2 E-3
STG» 1 E-6, 3 E-5, 3 8-4, 3 8-3 1 E-7. 1 E-6, 1 E-5, 1 8-4, 1 8-3
TM 1 E-5 1 8-3
GMT* 1 E-6, 1 B-4 3 E-5. 2 E-4
GMG 1 B-7, 5 E-5, 3 8-4, 2 E-3 1 8-6, 1 8-5. 5 8-4, 1 8-3
GMO» 1 E-7, 3 E-4, 3 E-4, 1 E-3 1 E-6, 1 E-5. 1 E-4, 2 E-3
PTO 2 E-6, 3 E-5, 4 E-4, 1 E-3 1 E-7, 2 E-5, 4 E-4, 3 E-3
PTM Not Applicable to DD-931
ET 1 E-6, 1 E-4, 1 E-4, 1 E-3 1 8-5. 2 E-4, 1 E-3
OS 1 E-7, 1 E-6, 1 E-5. 2 B-4, 3 E-3 2 8-6, 4 E-4, 5 E-3
BVf 1 E-7, 1 E-5, 1 B-4 1 8-5. 1 E-4, 2 E-3
RM 1 E-7, 1 E-6. 2 E-5, 3 8-4, 2 E-3 1 8-6, 2 E-4, 1 E-3
TM 1 E-6, 1 E-3 1 8-3
pn 1 E-7, 1 E-3 1 B-4
OK 1 E-6 1 8-3
MS 2 E-6, 2 E-5, 2 B-4, 3 E-3 1 8-7. 1 E-5. 3 E-4, 1 E-3
sh l s-5, 2 E-4, 1 E-3
sx 1 E-7, 1 E-4, 1 E-3 1 8-6, 1 E-4, 1 E-3
BT 1 E-7, 2 E-6, 5 8-5. 11 B-4, 12 E-3 1 8-8, 1 E-6, 2 E-5. 7 E-4, 3 E-3
MM 1 8-9.
10 E-4
1 E-7, 2 E-6, 6 8-5,
6 8-3
1 8-7. 1 E-6, 4 E-5. 4 E-4
MR 1 E-5
El* 1 E-6, 1 8-4
IC 1 E-6, 1 8-5, 1 8-4 1 8-4, 2 E-3
KT 1 E-6, 1 8-5, 2 8-4, 1 E-3 1 8-7. 1 E-6, 1 E-4, 1 E-3
EM 1 E-6, 1 E-5, 2 E-4. 1 E-3 1 8-7. 1 E-5, 2 E-4
PN 16 non-designated personnel if non-designated personnel
KM 1 E-7 1 8-3
SW 32 non-designated personnel 6 non-designated personnel
SN» 35 non-designated personnel 6 non-designated personnel
•Applicable to ships of this class which received ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare)
conversions
Total Assigned - 209 Active Duty Enlisted ( # 217 in ASW ships) - 117 Reserve personnel




THE FF-1040 GARCIA CLASS
PAST FRIGATE
PROPOSED ACTIVE/RESERVE MANNING STRUCTURE
Ratin* Nucl«U9,_Crew Reserve Crew
ON 1 E-6, 1 E-4, 1 E-3 1 E-5. 1 E-4
BM 1 E-7. 1 E-5. 3 E-4, 2 E-3 1 E-6. 2 E-5. 3 E-4, 3 E-3
SM 1 E-6, 1 E-4, 2 E-3 1 E-5. 1 E-4
STO 1 E-7. 2 E-6, 4 E-5. 1 E4, 2 E-3 1 E-6, 3 E-4, 2 E-3
TM 1 E-5 1 E-4
GMT 1 E-6, 1 E-4 3 B-5. 2 E-4
GMG 1 E-6, 1 E-5. 2 E-4 1 E-5. 2 E-3
PTG 1 E-6, 1 E-5. 3 B-4, 4 E-3 1 E-7, 2 E-6, 1 E-5
PTM Not Applicabl e to FF-1040
ET 1 E-7. 1 E-5. 2 E-4, 2 E-3 1 E-6. 1 E-5, 1 E-4, 2 E-3
OS 1 E-7, 1 E-6, 2 E-5. 2 E-4, 3 E-3 2 E-6, 2 E-5, 1* E-4
EW 1 E-7. 1 E-5. 2 E-4 1 E-5. 1 E-4, 2 E-3
m 1 E-7. 1 E-6. 1 E-5. 2 E 4, 2 E-3 1 E-6, 1 E-5. 3 E-4, 1 E-3
YW 1 E-6, 1 E-4
PN 1 E-7 1 E-4, 1 E-3
OK 1 E-6 1 E-3
KS 2 E-6, 1 E-5. 2 E-4, 2 E-3 1 E-3, 1 E-6
SH 1 E-5. 2 E-4, 1 E-3
SK 1 E-7. 1 E-4, 1 E-3 1 E-6, 1 E-5





1 E-7. 2 E-6, 4 E-5. 6 1 E-6, 1 E-5, 2 E-4, 1 E-3
MR 1 B-5
EN 1 E-6, 1 E-4 1 E-5
IC 1 E-6, 1 E-5. 1 E-4 1 E-4, 1 E-3
HT 1 E-6. 1 E-5. 3 E-4, 1 E-3 1 E-7, 2 E-6, 1 E-5
EM 1 E-6, 1 E-5. 2 E-4, 1 E-3 1 E-7, 1 E-4, 2 E-3
PN u . non--designated personnel 4 non-<iesignated personnel
KM 1 E-7 1 E-3
SH 32 non-designated personnel 6 non-designated personnel
Total Aasigne d - 181 Active Duty Enlisted - 96 Reserve Crew Personnel
Data Source
i




THE FF-1052 KNOX CLASS
PAST FRIGATE
PROPOSED ACTIYE/RESERVE MANNING STRUCTURE
Baiia* Nucleus Crew Reserve Crew
QM 1 E-6, 1 Z-k, L E-3 1 E-5. 1 Z-k
BM 1 E-7. 3 Z-k, 3 E-3 1 E-6, 2 E-5. 2 Z-k, 1* E-3
SM 1 E-6, 1 Z-k, 2 E-3 1 E-5. 1 E-4
STC 1 E-8. 2 E-6, 2 E-5. 2 Z-k, 3 E-3 1 E-6, 2 E-5. 3 E-4, 2 2-3
TM 1 E-5 1 Z-k
GMT 1 E-6, 1 Z-k 2 E-5. 1 E-4
GMG 1 E-6, 1 E-5. 1 E-4, 2 E-3 1 E-5. 1 E-4, 2 E-3
PTG 1 E-7. 1 E-5. 1 Z-k, 1 E-3 1 E-6, 1 E-5. 2 B-i*
PTM 1 E-6, 1 Z-k 1 E-5. 1 Z-k, 2 B-3
ST 1 E-7, 1 E-5. 3 Z-k 1 E-6, 2 E-5. 1 E-J*
OS 1 E-7. 1 E-6, 2 E-5. 2 Z-k, 2 E-3 2 E-6, 1 E-5. (t E-4, 7 B-3
EW 1 E-7, 1 E-5. 1 E-4 1 B-5, 1 E-4. 2 E-3
RM 1 E-6. 2 E-5, 3 E-4. 2 E-3 1 E-7. 1 E-6, 2 B-4
YN 1 E-6, 1 E-4
PN 1 E-7 1 E-4
OK 1 E-6 1 B-3
16 2 E-6, 1 E-5. 2 Z-k, 2 E-3 1 E-7
SH 1 B-5. 2 E-4. 1 E-3
SK 1 E-7. 1 E-U. 1 E-3 1 E-6. 1 E-5
BT 1 E-9. 2 E-6, 1+ E-5. 6 B-4, 7 Z-3 1 E-5, 1 E-6, 2 B-3
MM 1 E-7. 2 E-6. 3 E-5. 5 Z-k, 6 E-•3 1 E-8, 3 Z-k, 2 B-3
MR 1 E-5
EN 1 E-6, 1 Z-k
IC 1 E-6, 2 E-^ 1 E-5. 2 E-3
HT 1 E-6, 2 E-5. 1 Z-k, 1 E-3 1 E-7. 1 E-6, 1 E-5, 2 E-4
EM 1 E-6, 1 E-5, 2 E-4, 1 E-3 1 E-7. 1 Z-k, 1 B-3
PN 12 non-deslgnatisd pe rsonnel 3 non- deiiignated personnel
KM 1 E-7 1 B-3
SN 29 non-designatisd pe rsonnel 5 non- dejjignatei1 personnel
Total Assigned - 175 Active Duty Enlisted, 98 Reserve Crew Enlisted Personnel





THE LST-1179 NEWPORT CLASS
AMPHIBIOUS TANK LANDING SHIP
PROPOSED ACTIVE/RESERVE MANNING STRUCTURE
Nucleus Crew Reserve Crew
QM 1 E-6, 1 E-5. 1 E-4 2 E-4
BM 1 E-7, 1 E-5, U E-* 1 E-7, 1 E-5, 3 E-4
SM 1 E-6, 2 E-^, 1 E-3 1 E-5. 1 E-U, 1 E-3
STG Not Applicable to LST-117S Class
TM Not Applicable to L5T-117S' Class
GMT Not Applicable to LST-1179 Clas3
GMG 1 E-6, 2 E-5, 1 E-k, 3 E-3 1 E-7. 1 E-5, 1 E-U, 6 E-3
PTG 1 E-6, 1 E-5, 2 E-U, 3 E-3 1 E-7, 1 E-5. 2 E-3
FTM Not Applicable to IST-117<> Class
ET 1 E-6, 1 E-5, 1 E-U 1 E-5. 1 E-i
OS 1 E-7, 2 E-5, 2 E-4, 2 E-3 1 E-6, 1 E-5, 2 E-4, 2 E-3
BW Not Applicable to LST-117 ? Class
RM 1 E-7, 1 E-6, 1 E-5, 2 B-'*, 3 E-3 1 E-6. 1 E-5, 3 B-4
YN 1 E-6, 1 E-3 1 E-3
PN 1 E-6 1 E-k
DK 1 E-6 1 E-3
MS 2 E-6, 1 E-5, 2 E-k, 2 E-3 1 E-7, 2 E-3
SH 1 E-5. 2 E-fc, 1 E-3
SK 1 E-7, 1 E-l*, 1 E-3 1 B-5. 1 E-3
BT 1 E-6, 1 E-4, 1 E-3 1 E-l*
MM Not Applicable to LST-117'.1 Class
MR 1 E-5
EN 1 E-9, 2 E-6, k E-5, 5 E-U, 6 E-3 1 E-7. 2 E-6, 2 E-5, ** E-^, k E-3
IC 1 E-6, 2 E-4 1 E-5
KT 1 E-6, 1 E-5, 3 E-<* 1 E-7. 1 E-6, 1 E-5, 2 E-3
EM 1 E-7. * E-^, 2 E-3 1 E-6, 2 E-5, 1 E-3
FN 16 non-designated personnel 5 non- designated personnel
HM 1 E-7 1 E-k. 1 E-3
SN 1*2 non-designated personnel 8 non- designated personnel
Total Assigned - 159 Active Duty Enlisted - 83 Reserve Crew Personnel
Data Sourest (Chief of Naval Operations (c), 1976)
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condition III watchstation requirements specified in the SMD.
The reasons for exceptions to these nucleus crew manning
assignments is shown for each proposal in Table 8. In most
cases, billet substitutions were made to provide divisional
leaders, experienced maintenance technicians or support
services for the nucleus crew. In all cases, the combin-
ation of nucleus and reserve mobilization crews meets all
requirements specified in the SMD for condition I.
B. TRAINING SHIP CLASS AND HOMEPORT ASSIGNMENTS
1. The Naval Reserve Seaport Population
Data describing the Naval Reserve population in the
vicinity of sixteen continental U.S. ports and Hawaii is
included in Appendix A. Other seaport localities were not
included for two reasons. Either the Naval Reserve popu-
lation in these localities was too small, or, in the case of
the Great Lakes, treaty provisions with Canada eliminated
them as potential training ship homeports. The data shown
in Appendix A is an onboard personnel count as of December,
1979 in a total of fifty-five separate Naval Reserve train-
ing centers. Data regarding the extent to which the Naval
Reserve population shifts over time was not available. For
this reason, the population shown in Appendix A was assumed
constant in the analysis.
2. Training Ship Manpower Requirements and Reserve
Manpower Availability
The data shown in Table 9 is a summary presentation
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A. One E-6 or E-7 billet has been shifted from the reserve
crew to the nucleus crew in place of a more junior man in
the same rating. The substitution was made to provide
divisional leading petty officers and work center super-
visors for the nucleus crew.
B. No Condition III watchstations are listed in the SMD for
these ratings. Nucleus crew assignments in these ratings
are based on crew support requirements.
C. No Condition III watchstations are listed in the SMD for
these ratings. Nucleus crew assignments in these ratings
are based on equipment maintenance requirements.
D. Because Condition III and Condition I manning requirements
are nearly identical, nucleus crew petty officer manning
has been reduced to accommodate reserve crew personnel.
However, Condition III watchstations can be filled by
substituting non-designated firemen (FN,FA,FR) in place
of junior petty officers.
E. Because Condition III and Condition watchstation require-
ments are nearly identical, nucleus crew manning has been
reduced to two underway watch sections to make billets




PERCENTAGE OP RESERVE CREW MANPO'.VER
REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH CHIP CLASS MET BY
THE AVAILABLE NAZAL RESERVE POPULATION
AT SELECTED SITES
Ship Class and Proposed Reserve Crew Size
DO-931
117 Personnel
FP-10U0 / FF-1052 1 LST-1179
96 Personnel 98 Personnel I 83 Personnel
Locality
Percentage of Naval Reserve Personnel Available
to Fill Reserve Crew Billets
in One Ship of Each Class
Hawaii 505 595 565 715
Seattle* 89< 915 875 925
Portland. Ore. 905 915 885 ;oo5
San Francisco* 955 985 9^5 1005
Los Angeles* 985 1005 925 1005
San Diego* <»15 915 925 1005
Galv«ston, Tx. 925 895 655 965
Mobile. Ala. 905 875 865 1005
Tampa, Fla.* 835 835 785 895
Mayport, Fla.* 775 805 715 785
Charleston, S.C.* 6k* 685 715 705
Norfolk, VA* 855 865 855 935
Baltimore, Md.
,
Wash., D. C. 955 915 885
- 995
Philadelphia 985 985 1005 1005
New Tort, N.Y.* 1005 975 985 1005




Localities marked with a single asterisk are homeport3 for other Reserve training ships
(minesweepers and auxiliaries) that have not reached retirement age. To account for the
Reserve personnel in these ships, the population in the applicable localities was
reduced by each assigned training ship's reserve manning allowance prior to entry in the
analysis.
Baltimore and Washington, D.C. were combined due to their proximity and the fact that




requirements of each type of training ship were compared
to the current availability of Naval Reservists in each
locality. The comparison of the four training ship altern-
atives to the availability of Naval Reserve personnel was
done in order to identify the degree to which the reserve
population met 100 percent of the mobilization crew man-
power requirements in each of the four training ship classes.
The data in Table 9 illustrates this comparison in terms of
the percentage of Naval Reservists available to fill
mobilization billets aboard a ship of each class. For
example, of the 96 reservists needed to fully augment the
nucleus crew proposed for one FF-10^0 class fast frigate,
83 percent were available in the Tampa, Florida locality.
The data in Table 9 indicates that seven of the
localities have a Naval Reserve population large enough to
fill all of the reserve mobilization crew manpower require-
ments in any one of the training ship alternatives
considered. Of these seven localities, only three had a
Naval Reserve population sufficient to augment more than
one training ship. These localities were Los Angeles,
Philadelphia, and New York City.
By maintaining the same size nucleus crew and slightly
reducing the reserve mobilization crew manning requirements
for each training ship, the number of ship assignment options
increased. Table 10 shows the extent to which a five or ten
percent reduction in reserve mobilization crew manning




ALTERNATIVE NAVAL RESERVE TRAINING SHIP HOME PORT
ASSIGNMENTS UNDER VARIOUS RESERVE CREV MANNING LEVEL REQUIREMENTS
Locality
i
Reserve Crew Manning Level
100* 95* 90*
Possible Ship Assignments
Hawaii None None None
Seattle/Tacoma None None 1 LST-1179 Class,
o_£ 1 FF-10U0 Class
Portland, Ore. 1 LST-1179 Class 1 LST-1179 Class 1 LST-1179 Class,
2X 1 DD-931 Class,
or. 1 FF-10U0 Class
San Francisco 1 LST-1179 Class 1 L3T-1179 Class,
and 1 FF-10^0 Class
1 LST-1179 Class,
and 1 FF-10'JO Class,
or 1 LST-1179 Class,
and 1 DD-931 Class
Los Angeles 1 LST-1179 Cl*sa,
Si 1 FF-1040 Class
1 LST-1179 Class,
and 1 FF-10i+0 Class
o_r. 1 LST-1179 Class
and 1 DD-931 Class
1 LST-1179 Class,
and 1 FF-10^0 Class.
o_r 1 LST-1179 Class.
and 1 pF-1052 Class,
or. 2 LST-1179 Class
San Diego 1 LST-1179 Class 1 LST-1179 Class Any one ship chosen




Nona 1 LJT-1179 Class 1 LST-1179 Class,
pj: 1 DD-931 Class
Mobil* 1 LST-1179 Class 1 LST-1179 Class 1 LST-1179 Class,
or. 1 DD-931 Class
Tampa None None None
Jacksonville None None None
Charleston None None None
Norfolk None None 1 LST-1179 Class
Wash. , D. C. None None None
Baltimore None None 1 LST-1179 Class
Baltimore and
Wash. , O.C.
None 1 LST-1179 Clas3,
oj: 1 DD-931 Class
1 LST-1179 Tlass,
c_r 1 DD-931 Class,
or 1 FF-10UO Class
Philadelphia 1 LST-1179 Class,
ox 1 FF-1052 Class
1 LST-1179 Class,






New York 1 DD-931 Class,
ojc 3 LST-1179 Class
1 LST 1179 Class
and any one of the
oth?r thro» nltrr-
nativos, cj- 3 LST-
1179 Class
Any combination of
2 LST-1179 class and
any two ships choser.
from the other three
al terr.ati ves
Boston* None# None 1 LST-1179 Clas3,
or 1 DD-931 Class
•Note i 1 DD-931
locality
Class Reserve trnining ship is presently located in the Boston
at Newport, Rhode Island
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assignment options. However, it was also found that accepting
a reduction in the manning of the training ship's reserve
crew could affect its ability to serve as a combat unit
upon mobilization. In some cases the reduction in size
of the training ship's mobilization crew could only be made
possible by accepting disproportionate reductions in one
or two enlisted ratings such as operations specialist or
fire control technician.
C. ADDITIONAL RESERVE CREWS
The availability of a second reserve crew for each of
the training ship alternatives was considered to provide
at sea training for reservists in critical rating areas
whose mobilization assignments were elsewhere in the fleet.
However, since each of the training ship alternatives have
different equipment, the number of ratings applicable to
form a second crew varried with the choice of training
ships. For example of the thirteen undermanned ratings
shown in Table 2 eight apply to the LST-1179 class ship
and thirteen apply to the FF-1052 class frigate.
In areas where multiple ship assignment options were
found, the availability of a second reserve crew became
dependent on the extent to which the reserve population




To facilitate the comparison of training ship
alternatives, two conditions were imposed on the structure
of the second reserve crew prior to determining its avail-
ability within the local Naval Reserve population. These
conditions were:
a. The training ship location options chosen would be
those shown in Table 13 using a 90$ manning level require-
ment for the first reserve crew.
b. The second reserve crew would be composed of ten
Naval Reservists in each rating shown in Table 2 which
applied to the training ship.
The first condition was imposed because reducing the
manning level requirements for the first reserve crew allowed
a greater number of training ship assignments in most local-
ities. The second condition was imposed because ten Naval
Reservists in each applicable rating shown in Table 2
provided a second reserve crew nearly the size of the first.
This situation diminishes the possibility of messing and
berthing problems due to overcrowding.
Table 11 shows the results obtained by screening the
available Naval Reserve population for a second reserve
training crew. As the data indicates, there were no in-
stances in which the availability of reservists was sufficient
to completely man a second crew.
D. POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS
The nucleus crew manning proposals made for each of the




AVAILABILITY OF NAVAL RESERVISTS TO FORM AN ADDITIONAL TRAINING CREW
(Ship Assignment Options Are Based On A
90* Manning Level Requirement in the
Training Ship's Own Reserve Mobilization Crew)
Ship Assignment Number of Reserve Percentage of Reserve




For a Second Crew A Second Crew
Portland, Ore. 1. 1 LST-1179 Class 80 83*
2. 1 DD-931 Class 110 57*
3- 1 FF-10^0 Class 120 61*
Seattle/ 1. 1 LST-1179 Class 80 79*
Tacoma, Wash. 2. 1 FF-10U0 Class 120 69*
San Francisco 1. 1 LST-1179 Class dt 30 66*
1 DD-931 Class 110 65*
85*2. 1 LST-1179 Class k 80
1 FF-10^0 Class 120 68*
Los Angeles 1. 1 LST-1179 Class k 80 78*
1 FF-10U0 Class 120 68*
2. 1 LST-1179 Clasn k 80 76*
1 FF-1052 Class 130 70*
3- 2 LST-1179 Class 80 each 83* each
San Diego 1. 1 LST-1179 Class 80 89*
2. 1 FF-10UO Class 120 76*
3. 1 FF-1052 Class





1. 1 LST-1179 80 7*%
2. 1 DD-931 110 47*
Mobil*. Ala. 1. 1 LST-1179 Class 80 89*
1 2. 1 DD-931 Class 110 *9*
Norfolk. Va. 1. 1 LST-1179 Class 80 88*
Baltimore, Md. 1. 1 LST-1179 Class 80 98*
Wash., D. C. 2. 1 FF-1040 Class 120 82*
3. 1 DD-931 Class 110 85*
Philadlephia 1. 1 LST-1179 Class k 80 93*
1 FF-10^0 Class 120 72*
2. 1 LST-1179 Class k 80 93*
1 FF-1052 Class 130 68*
3. 1 LST-1179 Class k 80 89*
1 DD-931 Class 110 75*
New York 1. 2 LST-1179 Class k 80 each 85* each
2 FF-10^0 Class 120 each 70* each
2. 2 LST-1179 Class k 80 each 60* each
2 FF-1052 Class 130 each 62* each
3. 2 LST-1179 Class k 80 each 79* each
2 DD-931 Class 110 each 75* each
Boston 1. 1 LST-1179 Class 80 78*
2. 1 DD-931 Class 110 66* 1
Data Sourcet (Naval Reserve Personnel Center, 1979)
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watchstation, administrative, and crew support requirements
shown in Table 3 for manning condition of readiness III.
However, a review of each Ship's Manpower Document indicates
the possibility that two other manning conditions of readi-
ness III requirements might be only partially met due to the
reduction in the supply of full-time active duty manpower:
shipboard maintenance and endurance at sea.
1= Shipboard Maintenance
The first of these requirements is the accomplishment
of routine shipboard maintenance. Maintenance man-hour
requirements are specified in the SMD for each ship in the
fleet [Chief of Naval Operations (e), 1977] • These require-
ments are based on the time needed for equipment maintenance
and repair, cleaning, and ship preservation £chief of Naval
Operations (e), 1977 ]• The nucleus crew manning proposals
shown in Tables ^ through 7 reduce the number of active duty
crew member assignments in the SMD by about one-third.
Accordingly, the number of maintenance man-hours available
are also reduced.
For example, in the FF-1052 class frigate, an average
of 2^. 3 maintenance man-hours are assigned weekly to an
E-5 in the Boiler Technician (BT) rating £Chief of Naval
Operations (e), 1977]. A reduction in the number of BT's
in paygrade E-5 will either increase the maintenance work-
load for other BT's assigned or cause a backlog of deferred
maintenance. Table 12 shows the degree to which routine
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backlogged on a weekly basis as a result of a one-third
reduction in the number of personnel in the active duty
crew. The FF-1052 class frigate is the only training ship
for which a maintenance backlog was analyzed. However,
because of the general specifications by which all Navy
ships are constructed, a similar kind of maintenance backlog
could be expected in the other three training ship
alternatives.
2. Endurance at Sea
Sixty days endurance at sea is the second manning
condition of readiness III requirement which may only be
partially satisfied by the nucleus crew proposed for each
training ship alternative. There are two reasons why a
reduction in underway endurance in condition III might be
expected. The first is the possibility of higher equipment
failure rates due to backlogged routine maintenance. The
second reason is the lack of back-up personnel in the
nucleus crew to keep watchstations manned in the event of
crewmember absence or injury. Data was not available to
aid in estimating each training ship's endurance at sea
without reserve crew support. However, on the basis of
current operating schedules, underway periods for reserve




The nucleus and reserve crew manning assignments were
developed from the SMD for each training ship alternative.
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The reserve mobilization crew manpower requirements for each
training ship were compared to the Naval Reserve population
in seventeen seaport localities to determine the following:
a. The availability of training ship and homeport
assignment options based on a 100$ reserve vrew manning
level requirement.
b. The availability of training ship and homeport
assignment options at reserve crew manning levels of 95
percent and 90 percent.
A second reserve crew is proposed for each training ship
alternative based on critical rating needs in the active
fleet. The manning requirements proposed for the second
reserve vrew were compared to the Naval Reserve population




IV. TRAINING SHIP COST ANALYSIS
In this chapter the four training ship alternatives are
compared based on annual cost. Cost analysis is included to
provide additional information which could be relevant to a
decision concerning which ships, if any, should transfer to
the Naval Reserve.
A. DISCUSSION
All funds specifically budgeted for Naval Reserve
training ships in fiscal year 1980 (FY 80) were in the
Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) and Operation and Maintenance,
Reserve (0&M, R) appropriations [Dept. of Defense FY80
Appropriations, House Hearings]. Within these two appro-
priations, annual training ship expences charged directly
to the ship are grouped into five separate cost areas as
follows [[Dept. of Defense FY80 Appropriations, House Hearings!
a. Nucleus Crew Personnel Costs
b. Operating Target (OPTAR) Costs
c. Intermediate Maintenance Availability (IMA) Costs
d. Propulsion Fuel Costs
e. Shipyard Regular Overhaul Costs
While not specifically charged to Naval Reserve training
ships in the FY 80 budget, a portion of 0&M funding allocated
for base facility operations can be traced to the cost of
keeping each ship in service. This sixth category includes
such costs as pierside utilities, sewage and garbage
^0

disposal, pier maintenance, and other costs associated with
maintaining a water-front ship berthing facility.
The sum of the six cost areas represents the significant
expenses incurred in operating a Naval Reserve training ship
exclusive of extraordinary items such as hull or equipment
damage ^Dept. of Defense FY80 Appropriations, House Hearings].
The analysis compares training ship alternatives on the
basis of fiscal year 1980 price rates in each of the six
cost categories discussed above. For each category a
description of the cost inputs is given as well as compar-
ative data for each training ship alternative.
B. COST CATEGORIES
1. Nucleus Crew Personnel Costs
The enlisted billet cost model used to collect the
cost data for each alternatives training ship's nucleus crew
was constructed in 1980 at the Navy Personnel Research and
Development (NPRDC), San Diego [Koehler, 1980] . The NPRDC
enlisted billet cost model produces average total costs for
personnel in all ratings at every paygrade. The NPRDC model
groups twenty-seven personnel cost inputs into three separ-
ate categories. The first category is direct personnel cost
which includes base pay, allowances, proficiency and
hazardous duty pay, and active duty medical care. The
second category includes the costs of training and retire-
ment. The third category includes personnel overhead costs
such as dependent education and medical care, recreational


























































































O *n .-I C-- JHNO\CN>AO^
U^ CM r-l CM OOQUOJ^nHN
^ co c^-f*^ fMor c^ cn r^ co o- NCD H
r>vO u3 O O





OJ O O vO O CM CJ\
U~\CVCM CM CVo Ui_f r-
envo cm cn rs^i \o
COCMVOCMvO^- U~>OCM OCN»0v\0 4* O <7» Ov »<©•-* OOv* O CM O --I CS- CO J-OOONH^N^Nr* <J*i*~t) y>'OaO\(V'ri(^rt>^J Cfc-CO H -* J" CO O O
vO CM O- fv—J<OOOr4 CM.\*0- HIAO^ CN-Cnr-OQ-vO a© « O ^ O GsvO o ^
0\ON^HONCMv-C^Of^W vrmO^OONOX>0>ONO cn^J- O
V>o\OMD CM J- CD CVnO O C»vfi VT\cnCM CM cn\D vrv CM CO i-+ cn *n ooo cm u"\0-
i-t CM "r-t .-,-* ff i-l mCM r-l <n
efj-
COr\vf irH^4 O^t 00OC0O4 OC\0^0»0\O^Ot>C\^^M)Noonconncoh o^ooc^Nco-cjvAr^^r^-cMr-aDr^ u-v-j- coon
vO CJv O- -3" J- vO vn o JiT)iAncO-N'v"'MDd'C>CJCN ^0 ,i) OCO







rvo o w^^o^o o(\jn j t>- o o o- o <nj- ao
CM O CO J- cn CM (M rsvfl UAOHr-in^OKlN^O







CD CM ^.^ \0 VT\CO H(^CM>rl4(>^^NNO\D(M>wiHN4N




cmc*> o^cno^roo'AoN^ mr-03 ooo^^oci
OCM cooo^oco nnw ^^\o >J"vo Nrif^^OMDNoo
CM C^ rH r-l r-l J" -^ CM J-
cj e-i o cjj s:
ct w to to f- a o u- b. u o w o: >' a, a r-. to co m
r-: cc rr. o e- :~ r=: ;s z


























































































































data produced by the NPRDC enlisted billet cost model,
the nucleus crew personnel costs for each of the training
ships were determined. These costs are presented in
Table 13-
2. Shipboard Upkeep and Maintenance Costs
All Naval Surface Force ships receive annual funding
from their Type Commanders in the form of an operating
target (OPTAR). Apportioned on a quarterly basis, these
funds are provided to replenish each ship's repair parts
stock and obtain consumable items such as paint, cleansers,
and lubricating oils. The amount of OPTAR funding granted
to a particular ship is dependent on the size of the Type
Commander's annual operating budget and the anticipated
funding needs of the class [Butt, 1979]. The OPTAR amounts
shown below in Table 14 are those which were planned for













REPAIR PARTS $320,000 $260,000 $280,000 $180,000
CONSUMABLES 175,000 135,000 151,000 124,000
TOTAL OPTAR ^95,000 395,000 431,000 314,000
Data Source: [Butt, 19791
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3. Intermediate Maintenance Availability (IMA) Costs
Intermediate level maintenance in surface ships is
accomplished by destroyer tenders, repair ships, and shore-
based ship intermediate maintenance activities, Availabilities
with intermediate maintenance activities are regularly
scheduled for all surface ships. Availabilities average
two and one-half to four weeks in length depending on the
type of ship being tended Qviebane , 198cQ. As of December,
1979. surface ships in the Atlantic Fleet received IMA's an
average of twice annually ^Mebane , 1980I.
There were two resource inputs used in the analysis
to compare IMA costs for each of the four training ship
alternatives. These were maintenance activity man-hours and
the cost of repair parts and materials. Other costs such as
machine ship equipment wear or a repair ship overhaul were
not included due to the nonavailability of cost data.
There was no cost standard available to apply to
intermediate maintenance activity man-hours. Unlike ship-
yards, intermediate maintenance activities are manned with
military personnel and, although the labor cost is real,
reimbursement for man-hours is not a consideration ["Rogers,
I98OJ. However, intermediate maintenance activity man-hours
are recorded and tracked for two reasons. First, the man-
hour data can be used either for intermediate maintenance
activity workload planning or for maintenance trend analysis
is any particular class of ship. Second, because IMA man-
hours are used to apply repair parts and other materials
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costs to each repair availability at the rate of $6.00 per
man-hour [Rogers, I980I.
By using historical work load data compiled between
1975 and 1978 [Rogers, 1980"^, an average number of IMA man-
hours expended on one ship in each of the four classes under
consideration was determined. This man-hour average was
applied at the Fiscal Year 1980 materials cost standard to
provide a means of comparing one alternative with another
on the basis of IMA cost. Table 15 provides both IMA man-
hour and materials cost data for each of the four training
ship alternatives.
TABLE 15
INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE AVAILABILITY AVERAGE MATERIALS
COST AND REPAIR ACTIVITY MAN-HOURS
EXPENDED BY SHIP CLASS
DD-931 FF-10^0 FF-1052 LST-1179
Average Man-Hours
Extdended Per
Availability 18,013 11,^8^ 12,100 10,^62
Materials Cost
® $6.00 Per
Man-Hour $108,078 $68,078 $72,68^ $62,772
Data Source: [Rogers, 1980]
k. Fuel Costs
Except for nuclear powered cruisers, the standard
propulsion fuel used by ships in the Naval Surface Force is
marine diesel fuel (DFM) . Fuel deliveries are contracted by
the Navy on an annual basis. The fiscal year 1980 contract




Fuel costs used in the analysis were based on each ship's
consumption rate at standard speed. Standard speed was
chosen because it approximates the mid-point in each altern-
ative's speed capability [cOMNAVSURFLANT, 1976 J. Table 16
below presents a comparison of each training ship altern-
ative's fuel consumption at standard speed on the basis of
seventy-six days at sea each year. Seventy-six days underway
corresponds to one underway weekend each month and a two week
annual training for the two proposed reserve crews.
TABLE 16
FUEL COST AT STANDARD SPEED
BASED ON SEVENTY-SIX DAYS AT SEA
DD-931 FF-1040 FF-1052 LST-1179
Class Class Class Class
Total Barrels of
DFM Expended 28,723 30,598 29,286 27,6^6
Fiscal Year
1980 Cost
@ $25.65 per BBL $682,8^7 $727,^12 $696,215 $657,226
Data Source: COMNAVSURFLANT Instruction 3500.2
5. Regular Overhaul Costs
Naval and commercial shipyards allocate costs to
customers based on current man-day rates. These man-day
rates vary among shipyards depending on their individual
overhead costs ^Mascaro, 1979]- To estimate the total cost
of any ship's overhaul work package, planners use a standard
man-day rate. As of December, 1979, the rate was $208.00




Average overhaul costs were computed by applying the
standard $208.00 man- day rate to the average number of man-
days [^Nicholson, 1979
"J
required to overhaul a ship in each
of the four ship classes considered. This average overhaul
cost was then divided by the number of years in the overhaul
cycle to produce an average annual overhaul cost on the basis
of FY 80 man-day rates and a five year overhaul cycle. The
average number of man-days required to overhaul a ship in a
given class has remained fairly constant over time [Ellis,
1979~\- However, changes in average shipyard man-day rates
or length of overhaul cycle could affect the cost ranking
of the four alternatives. For example, given a $250.00 man-
day rate and a three year overhaul cycle, the annual overhaul
cost differential between FF-1052 Class frigates and DD-931
Class destroyers increased from $570 thousand to over $1.6
million. The overhaul costs shown in Table 17 are based on
overhaul frequency and man-day rates prevailing in the first




1980 AVERAGE SHIPYARD OVERHAUL COST
FOR EACH TRAINING SHIP ALTERNATIVE
DD-931 FF-1040 FF-1052 LST-1179










Man-Day $11,003,200 $12,509,120 $13,852,800 $1,599,936
Annual Overhaul
Cost Included
In The Analysis $2,200.640 $ 2, 501,824 $ 2,770,560 $1,599,936
Data Source: Nicholson, 1979
6. Pierside Utility Costs
It is common practice in each of the four alternative
ship classes considered in this study to shut down their
power generating plants and rely on pierside utility services
when available \ Bridges , 19793* The "three Pi er services
normally provided are heating steam, electricity, and potable
water [Bridges, 1979"]
•
The utility charge and standard consumption rates
for each class of ship included in the analysis were applic-
able to the Philadelphis Naval Base as of December, 1979
[Bridges, 1979j» Potable water cost was disregarded because




The utility costs included in Table 18 were based
upon two constraints imposed to standardize each training
ship's operation. The first was that each training ship
would be at sea for seventy-six days per year training
reservists. The second assumption was that upon returning
to port each training ship would shut down its internal
power plant and receive utility services from the pier.




FOR EACH TRAINING SHIP ALTERNATIVE
ANNUAL COST BY SHIP CLASS
Utility Charge Rate DD-931 FF-10^0 FF-10 52 LST-1179
Steam $ 8.50/MBTU $5^9,2^0 $^39,3^0 $^39,3^0 $219,671
Electricity 66. 00/Mwh $123,015 $109,376 $109,376 $ 82,622
Total Annual Utility
Costs $672,255 $5^8,716 $5-^8,716 $302,293
Data Source: Public Works Department, Naval Shipyard
Philadelphia, PA.
C . SUMMARY
Table 19 is a summary presentation of the six cost areas
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The total costs shewn for each training ship alternative
were determined on the basis of a set of imposed conditions
relating to one or more of the six cost categories. These
conditions included defining the training ship's nucleus
crew, the underway operating schedule, and the current
regular overhaul cycle. As indicated in Table 19 % the
majority of annual costs incurred were for personnel and
regular overhaul.
Based only on the total cost figures shown in Table 19
»
the LST-1179 class ship appears the most likely choice among
the four alternatives. However, the lesser capability of
this class ship to provide training for additional reserve
crews could make it a less attractive training platform
regardless of cost. Further discussion of each training
ship alternative and possible homeport assignments is
included in Chapter V.
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V. ANALYSIS FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. ANALYSIS FINDINGS
This study was designed to analyze four alternative ship
classes as candidates for Naval Reserve training ship assign-
ments. Twelve of seventeen localities included in the
analysis had a current Naval Reserve population of sufficient
range and depth to fill at least 90 percent of the mobil-
ization crew billets in one or more of the four training
ship alternatives studied. Reserve mobilization crew billets
were assigned to each candidate training ship on the basis
of conditional manning requirements specified in each Ship
Manpower Document (SMD). The SMD was used to provide a
standard manpower comparison base for each training ship
alternative studied. The requirement to fill 90 percent of
reserve mobilization crew billets was chosen because it
approximates the reserve manning goal aboard training ships
currently in service fMcClanahan, 1980]. However, it is
recognized that at the 90 percent level some reserve ratings
required to fill out the mobilization crew could be seriously
deficient.
Of the four training ship alternatives included in the
analysis, reserve mobilization crew billets were filled most
often in LST-1179 class tank landing ships. The remaining
three classes of ships, listed in order of decreasing
frequency of filled reserve mobilization crew billets are
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FF-10^0 Class frigates, DD-931 Class destroyers, and FF-1052
Class frigates. The primary reason for this ordering was
limited availability of Naval Reservists in the following
ratings
:
a. Operations Specialist (CS)
b. Electronic Warfare Specialist (E T.\)
c. Fire Control Technician (Missiles) (FTM)
d. Gunner's Mate (Technical) (GMT)
None of these four ratings apply to LST-1179 Class tank
landing ships, while some or all are required to man the
frigates and destroyers. A secondary reason for the ordering
was the 'uneven distribution of other ratings in the reserve
seaport population studied.
'"hen required to fill 90 percent of each training ship's
reserve mobilization crew billets, the number of available
training ship assignment options ranged from sixteen to
eighteen depending on which ships were chosen, '..'her. this
requirement was raised to 95 percent and then to 100 percent,
the number of training ship assignment options decreased
to fourteen and nine, respectively. At the 90 percent level,
LST-1179 Class tank landing ships accounted for about cr.e-
half of the available options. At the 95 percent and ICO
percent levels, LST-1179 riass tank landing ships accounted
for approximately two-thirds of the training ship assignment
options. At all three percentage levels, the remaining
portlcr. of the training shit assignment options were almost
evenly divided among the destroyer and frigate classes.
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The availability of critical ratings to form a second
reserve crew for each training ship varied in each locality
with the rating distribution in the local population.
Because of their need for fewer critical ratings, LST-1179
Class tank landing ships consistently had higher reserve
manning percentages in the second reserve crew than the
other three training ship alternatives. Of course fewer
critical ratings can be trained aboard a ship in the LST-
1179 Class.
In addition to the four critical ratings affecting the
extent to which reserve mobilization crew billets could be
filled aboard the destroyers and frigates, shortages of
reservists in five other critical ratings caused low manning
percentages in the second reserve crew. These five ratings
were as follows:
a. Sonar Technician (Surface) (STG)
b. Torpedoman's Mate (TM)
c. Boiler Technician (BT)
d. Fire Control Technician (Guns) (FTG)
e. Gunner's Mate (Guns) (GMG)
All of the five ratings above apply to the destroyer and
frigate classes studied whereas only three of the five can
be trained aboard LST-1179 Class tank landing ships.
Using the cost inputs included in the analysis, LST-1179
Class tank landing ships are between 25 percent and 30
percent less expensive to operate and maintain than the
destroyers and frigates studied. For each training ship
5^

alternative included in the analysis, nucleus crew personnel
costs accounted for the largest portion of total annual cost.
In order of decreasing magnitude the remaining cost areas
were regular overhaul, propulsion fuel, pierside utility
service, annual operating target, and Intermediate Maintenance
Availability (IMA) materials costs. Shortening the overhaul
cycle could change the order of the first two costs since a
larger fraction of total overhaul cost would be applied each
year.
B. LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
The analysis was limited due to nonavailability of data
relating to three major resource inputs. First, there was a
lack of data available for the training ship alternatives
studied. The four training ship alternatives met policy
criteria for equipping the Naval Reserve, therefore each was
analyzed without regard to combat capability. Each of the
four training ship classes studied differ in terms of in-
stalled sensors and offensive weapons. As a result, one ship
class could be of more value than the others in an overseas
deployment status. However, the means by which these differ-
ent sensors and weapons could be compared and ranked was not
available for the analysis.
Second, the rating distribution of the Naval Reserve
population may shift over time in each locality as a result
of new accessions and attrition. The extent to which this
shift will take place is difficult if not practically
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impossible to predict. For this reason, the ship and
homeport options presented in the analysis are subject to
change. However, given more current data, the same method
can be used to generate a new set of options at any time.
It is very possible that deferred routine maintenance
resulting from undermanned active duty drew will manifest
itself in the form of higher overhaul and IMA costs in the
long run. For this reason, the cost of deferred maintenance
should be factored into the analysis. The same is true of
IMA manpower costs. However, even though recognized,
estimating these costs to a reasonable degree of accuracy
would be extremely difficult due to the number of variables
involved.
C. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Based on the nonavailability of data in portions of the
analysis in this thesis, there are at least three additional
areas open for research involving the Naval Reserve training
ship program. First, development of some means to rank
candidate Naval Reserve training ships based on their military
contribution to the deployed forces could aid the decision
process. The ranking could reduce the field of candidates
when more than one training ship alternative appears equally
suitable for assignment to the Naval Reserve.
Second, development of a system to predict rating flux
in the local Naval Reserve populations could be used for two
purposes. One is to aid in choosing a training ship by fore-
casting the expected rating composition of the Naval Reserve
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population in each locality being considered. Another is to
provide some means to measure the expected permanance of the
Naval Reserve populations to estimate expected training
ship assignment duration. Third, the effect of deferred
routine maintenance in each training ship could be expanded
beyond a man-hour count to include operational reliability
and increased regular overhaul and IMA costs.
This thesis has generally viewed the Naval Reserve as a
statutory necessity and a drain on fleet operating resources.
However, the Naval Reserve could be viewed as a potential
source of peacetime manpower for the fleet. The fleet is
now in the early stages of an expansion program which will
increase its size from about ^80 to 600 ships of various
types and classes. Unless recruitment and retention incent-
ives improve, the Navy could be forced to idle some ships
in the future for lack of a crew (^American Enterprise Inst.
,
19777. One possible solution to be investigated is the
transfer of ships to the Naval Reserve to keep them operating
and available in a ready status if needed.
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the results of the analysis do not indicate a
single answer to the question of which ships should be trans-
ferred to the Naval Reserve, two conclusions can be drawn.
The first is that after establishing minimum reserve mobil-
ization crew manning level requirements, even at the 90
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percent level the Naval Reserve training mission as it is
currently defined [.Chief of Naval Operations (a), 1978 J can
be performed with fewer than the 25 destroyers assigned in
1979- The second conclusion is that the economy realized
by employing LST-1179 Class tank landing ships in Naval
Reserve training assignments is offset by the LST's narrower
ability to train a wide range of enlisted ratings.
If elimination of Naval Reserve training ships WDept. of
Defense FY80 Appropriations, House Hearings 1 is not an option
available to the Navy, then rather than replacing the 25
obsolete destroyers on a one for one basis, it is possible
to develop a compromise training ship replacement schedule
which would minimize the number of ships transferred from
the active fleet, continue the Naval Reserve training ship
program, and satisfy Congressional intent.
Ships transferred to the Naval Reserve have traditionally
remained in a trainer status until retirement regardless of
the availability of reserve manpower to fill mobilization
crew billets [_Evans , 19791. The change recommended in this
thesis is that ship transfers to the Naval Reserve be made
conditional on the supply of reservists to keep the mobil-
ization crew manned at a predetermined level. By establishing
a minimum manning level standard for the reserve mobilization
crew, ships could rotate in and out of Naval Reserve training
assignments, governed by reserve manpower availability.
There are four separate steps to the course of action
recommended in this thesis. These are as follows:
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a. Clearly define the minimum acceptable manning level
in a training ship's reserve mobilization crew.
b. Where training ship assignments are feasible subject
to the minimum acceptable reserve mobilization crew manning
level, utilize the ship to train a second reserve crew.
c. Periodically review the Naval Reserve population to
determine whether the training ships assigned can continue
to be manned at the minimum acceptable level.
d. Rotate training ships in and out of the Naval Reserve
subject to the availability of reserve manpower for the ship's
mobilization crew.
The minimum acceptable manning level for the training
ship's reserve mobilization crew could be established within
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) on the
basis Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) for each ship
class in a wartime environment. Once established, the Navy
could then justify the size of its training ship program on
the basis of reserve manpower availability.
Identifying the second training crew within the available
Naval Reserve Population could be accomplished within the
Office of the Chief of Naval Reserve (CNAVRES) based on
active fleet manpower requirement inputs from OPNAV. The
reorganization of existing reserve training units to provide
reservists for both the ship's mobilization crew and the
second training crew could be accomplished through the
CNAVRES chain of command.
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The review of the Naval Reserve population to determine
if minimum acceptable reserve crew mobilization crew manning
levels have been maintained could be done within OPNAV using
manning information provided by the Naval Reserve Personnel
Center, New Orleans. This review could be done as often as
each year in the POM process prior to submitting the annual
budget to Congress. Actual ship movements to and from the
Naval Reserve could be accomplished at the Fleet and Type
Commander level in order to coordinate assignment rotations
with overseas deployment and overhaul schedules.
There are at least three potential advantages which could
be realized by implementing the above recommendations. First,
the four steps involved in the recommendations could serve
to justify the training ship portion of the reserve appro-
priation request using reserve manpower availability as a
single criterion. Second, by setting a minimum reserve
mobilization crew manning level standard on the basis of ROC,
the Navy could be reasonably sure that the training ship will
be sufficiently manned to serve in the fleet during wartime.
Third, by training a second reserve crew, the Navy could more













EW Electronic Warfare Specialist
STG Sonar Technician (Surface)
TM Torpedoman's Mate
GMG Gunner's Mate (Guns)
GMT Gunner's Mate (Technical)
FTG Fire Control Technician (Guns)



















Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Population as of December 1979




























E-2 E-3 E-4 ^5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9 Total
1 1? 28. .11 18 L 1 78
1 2 4 5 6 4 22
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•H 2 10 20 2A 26 24 4 1 112
*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: Quincy, Mass., Worcester, Mass.,
New Bedford, Mass., Lawrence, Mass., and Providence,
R.I.




Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Population as of December 1979
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1. A3 23 -Z.1 17 6 121
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*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: Bronx, N.Y., Brooklyn, N.I.,
Whitestone, N.Y., New Rochelle, N.I., Staten Island,
^.Y., Freeport, N.Y., Huntington, N.I., Clifton, N.J.
Perth Amboy, N.J., Elizabeth, N.J,, and Bayonne,N.J.




Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Population as of December 1979





















































E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6 B-7 B-8 E-Q Tot.nl
5. 25 U. 18 11 2 75
1 6 3 4 3 2 19
1 1 7 5 4 2 1 21
2 1 13 15 4 8 2 45
1 2 2 1 6
2 2 2 1 1 1 9
1 1 1 2 2 1 8
3 5 8 u 4 4 1 39
1 2 1 4
2 1 3 5 3 1 1 16
3 1 3 1 8
1 1 5 11 15 6 1 40
4 23 19 19 11 9 85
1 3 33 27 17 10 91
1 6 8 16 7 1 1 1 41
2 5 3 6 3 19
. 4 2 28 24 7 6 3 8A
L z. U 11 6 3 42
1 9 6 4 1 21
1 2 7 1 11
3 5 27 H 7 7 o> 3 69
1 2 2 1 6
1 2 13 13 10 5 1 Z.5
2 8 18 18 11 5 1 6?
1 8 8 13 1 m
? 9 24 24 20 29 3 1 106
*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: Philadelphia, Pa,, Reading, Pa,,
Folsom, N.J., West Trenton, N.J., and Wilmington,
Del,

























Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Population as of December 1979




























*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: Baltimore, Md.
Data Source: NRPC Report - 4080-1050-7D (Data run 12/15/79)
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i
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gton, D.C.(see note below)
Pay^rade
B-5 E-6 E-7 Ir-8 B-9 Total
BM 8 A . 1 3 16
QM -4 6 A L 1 19
SM 1 3 1 7
OS* 1 3 2 1 7
EW* 1 1
STG* 1 1 2 K
TM*
1 U 3 2 1 11
GMG*
1 L 3 1 9
GMT*
1 1 2
FTG* 2 1 1 2 2 1 9
FTM*
1 5 3 9
ET* 2 A 2 11 6 U 1 30
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1 . 2 23 36 21 10 1 1 100
PN 4 6 U 3 1 1 19
HM 2 1 1 k
SK 2 6 11 u 3 1 1 38
MS 1 3 3 1 3
SH 5 3 k 1 13
DK 2 6 2 2 12
MM 5 3 7 8 1 29
EN* 3 5 3 -4 3 28
BT* 1 3 1 1 2 8
EM A 2 5 A 3 18
IC 1 1 1 3 2 8
HT* 2 6 5 3 1
„
17
*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: Alexandria, Va., and Adelphi, Md.




Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Population as of December 1979
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*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: Norfolk, Va., Richmond, Va., and
Newport News, Va.




Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Population as of December 1979
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*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: Charleston, S.C.




Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Population as of December 1979
Locality: Mayport, Fla, (see note below)
Paygrade








































































*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: Jacksonville, Fla.




Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Population as of December 1979
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*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: Tampa, Fla., and St. Petersburg,
Fla.




Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Population as of December 1979
Locality: Mobile, Ala, (see note below)
Paygrade

















































































*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: New Orleans, La., Mobile, Ala., and
Pensacola, Fla.























Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Population as of December 1979
Locality: Galveston, Tx. (see note below)
Paygrade
























































*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: Houston, Tx.




Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Population as of December 1979
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jOS Angeles, Cal.(see note below)
Paygrade
E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 B-8 B-9 Total,
BM 2 28 21
.
26 10 2 1 90
QM 1 2 8 9 9 6 2 1 38
SM 1 2 4 5 7 1 20
OS* 1 7 9 3 5 25
EW* 1 1 5 7
STG* 1 2 3 6 1 2 1 1 17
TM*
1 2 1 2 6
GMG* 1 4 6 9 3 1 24
GMT*
3 2 3 8
FTG* 6 5 3 2 2 2 21
FTM*
1 2 6 1 10
ET* 3 11. 11 21 7 53
RM*
—
. 4 Q 25 26 M, 3 1 87
YN 3 3Z. 33 28 8 2 108
PN
1 6 14 16 5 2 u
HM 2 2 2 1 7
SK
1 4 27 33 19 3 3 90
MS 2 7 11 U 7 6 47
SH 1 17 8 2 28
DK 2 1 1 4
MM 8 U 10 21 11 64
EN* 5 6 9 21 16 9 3 1 70
BT* 1 2 5 6 10 2 1 27
EM 1 7 10 20 15 11 3 1 68
IC 2 8 7 3 A 1 25
HT*
-JL- A 26 15 18. 8 1 76
*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following^ Naval Reserve
training centers: Los Angeles, Cal,, Long Beach, Cal.
Pomona, Cal., and Santa Ana, Cal,























Locality: San Francisco, Cal .(see note below)
Pavgrade
E-2 E-3 E-4 rJ-5 E-6 E-7 F-8 &-<) Tot.nl
BM 3. 19 15 . 1.6 13 2 68
QM 2 10 15 11 6 3 1 48
SM 3 3 6 4 4 20
OS* 2 2 4 8 6 4 26
EW* 2 2 2 6
STG* 2 3 5 2 3 4 19
TM* 2 4. 1 3 10
GMG* 3 6 4 4 3 2 22
GMT* 2 3 1 6
FTG*
2 3 6 5 1 17
FTM*
1 2 3 6
ET*
4. 11 8 19 31 10 2 1 86
RM*
.. 3 11 1*5 18 12 6 2 67
YN
1 1 37 33 23 16 111
PN
-.,2 11 7 5 5 2 1 33
HM
1 2 1 A 1 9
SK
-
,2, 2 21 A3 26 3 2 104
MS
1 7 15 8 8 1 1 41
SH
1 £ 11 1 8 25
DK 1 2 1 3 7
MM 1 7 19 13 2A 9 6 1 80
EN*
. 4 10 7 11 23 18 2 75





7 11 15 25 4 1 64
IC 1 7 13 9 6 36
HT* 3 8 24 2? 28 10 .. 75
*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: San Francisco, Cal., Alameda, Cal.,
Vallejo, Cal,, San Bruno, Cal,, and San Jose, Cal.





















Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Population as of December 1979




























*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: Portland, Ore., and Salem, Ore.
E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 R-9 Tot.nl
1 7 12, .3 4
i 27
6 4 2 2 14
1 1 2 1 1 7
1 3 3 4 2 13
1 2
1 2 3 1 7
2 1 4
1 5 4 4 15
2 3 5
1 1 3 2 8
1 ? 5
1 2 6 2 10 2 1 24
1 4 ? 9 5 3 27
1 7 10 6 3 1 28
3 5 3 3 1 25
1 2 2 4 1 10
1 5 13 11 2 1 33
1 A 2 6 1 15
1 2 2 5
1 2 1 1 1 6
1 7 7 7 5 3 30
1 A 5 9 7 2 29
3 7 7 A 21
2 5 5 12 7 1 32
1 2 5 8 1 17
1 A 11 10 L 8 38




Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Popula+ion as of December 1979
Locality: Seattle, Wash. (see note below)
Paygrade

































































































*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: Seattle, Wash., Tacoma, Wash.,
Bremerton, Wash., Oak Harbor, Wash, And Sverette,
Wash.




Naval Reserve (Surface Force) Population as of December 1979
Locality: Hawaii (see note below)
Paygrade




























1 3 2 2 1 9

















2 3 3 3 11
•H
1 4 3 1 2 13
5 5 2 1 13
5»
1 2 1 4
•H
+> 1 2 1 4
2 2 1 5 1 9
4
01 1 3 6 1 11
1 1
o
3 2 1 1 4
2 4. 2 1 9
bo
.9
1 2 1 1 5
1 1 2




•H 2 1 4 1 8
*Note: The data above was obtained from automated personnel
assignment counts in the following Naval Reserve
training centers: Honolulu, Hawaii
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